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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STAT'E OF UTAH 
F-<\lj(:ONAERO ENTERPRISE, 
INC., n Utah Corporation, and 
ClfARijES W. TAGGART, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
-\'S.-
JOHN F. BOWERS, et al, 
Defendants, 
INTERMOUNTAIN DEVELOP-
1\tiENT, INC., a Corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case 
No.10173 
RESP'ONDENTS' BRIEF 
RESPONDENTS' STAT~MENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's Statement of Facts is not objective, is 
consistently argumentative in favor of the appellant and 
significantly omits some very material facts. The fol-
lowing should be added to modify appellant's Statement 
of Facts in order to at least give a fair statement of 
the case. 
1 
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Defendant-appellant did not establish a fee title back 
to the patentee (Pre-trial Exhibit 3, defendant's ab-
stract.) 1 
Respondent-plaintiff paid all of the taxes, delin-
quency penalties, interest and costs for the years 1949 
through 1954 (R. 56, 67-69). Falconero paid the general 
taxes on time and without delinquency for the years 1955 
through 1961 (R. 69, Exhibit P. 30). 
Respondent Falconero erected and maintained a 
barbed wire and electric wire fence completely around 
the property (R. 31, 43, 57) from 1949 through 1962 (R. 
34). The land in question was used as part of a larger 
tract of 1,000 acres owned by Falconero for horseback 
riding, pasturing and a combination recreation area (R. 
41-42). The combination recreation area included the 
facilities of the Chuck Wagon Restaurant, stables and 
lake. 
The appellant was never in possession of the land 
nor did the appellant or anyone make any claim to pos-
session or use of the property adverse to that of Fal-
conaero (R. 43, 57, 85, 86). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT FA L C 0 N A E R 0 ENTER-
PRISE, INC., WAS A PROPER PLAINTIFF. 
--,-At page 15 of said Exhibit is a deed to Carrie A. Dunlevy. At page 16 
is a deed to Genevieve J. Callister, wife of counsel for appellant, from 
C. Athleta Dunlevy Tearney, the daughter of one of the heirs at law 
of 0. M. Dunlevy and Carrie A. Dunlevy. Obviously, such a deed 
from only one of the alleged heirs, without a probate proceeding or a 
determination of heirship proceeding to show the true heirship does 
not convey fee tide. 
2 
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In appellant's Points 1 and 2 counsel for appellant 
claims that Falconero Enterprise, Inc., respondent, 
could not have brought this action since it had filed its 
complaint herein subsequent to the dissolution proceed-
ing. ,\ ppellant makes this contention notwithstanding the 
fnct that it admitted in its answer appellant's existence 
(H. 5). Thereafter in contradiction appellant amended 
its deft•nse just prior to pre-trial (R. 8) . 
..:\.ppellant 's contention under this point is obviously 
untenable because of the Utah statutes and the general 
prineiple of law to the effect that in a dissolution the 
corporation is entitled to sue in its own name upon any 
cause of action existing at the time of the dissolution. 
Section 16-10-11, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, 
in the Business Corporation Act provides in part as 
follows: 
"The dissolution of a corporation ... shall not 
take away or impair any remedy available to or 
against the corporation, its directors, officers or 
shareholders, for any right or claim existing, or 
any liability incurred, prior to such dissolution, if 
action or other proceeding thereon is commenced 
within two years after the date of such dissolution. 
Any such action or proceeding by or aga.inst the 
corporation may be prosecuted or defended by the 
corporation in its corporate name." (Emphasis 
added) 
The corporation certainly had a claim and a right to 
quiet title to this property at the time of the dissolution. 
The fact that the property was distributed in the dissolu-
tion does not, under said statute, take away the right or 
3 
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claim existing prior to such dissolution. The statute 
very clearly states that the corporation can within two 
years bring such an action. This action was commenced 
within thirty days after the dissolution. 
In the dissolution the corporation conveyed the prop-
erty by warranty deed, (pre-trial Exhibit 1), to Charles 
W. Taggart, Trustee. In addition therefore to the reser-
vation of the right to sue set forth in the statute above, 
the corporation had a sufficient property interest by 
reason of its obligation on the warranty deed to convey 
after acquired title to bring this action. See Section 
57-1-10, Utah Code Annotated, Boothe v. Wya.tt, 54 Utah 
550, 183 P. 2d 323, and Gulley v. Christian,. 176 P. 2d 812 
cited by appellant. In the Gulley case the court in citing 
various cases stated, ''a warrantor has sufficient interest 
upon which to base a suit in his own name to quiet the 
title of his grantee." See also King K ade v. Plummer, 
239 Pac. 628 (Okla.); Hacienda Homes v. Peck, 113 P. 
2d 487 (Calif.); Piland v. Craig, 154 P. 2d 583 (Okla.); 
and the annotation in 97 A. L. R. 711 citing many cases 
in support of this general rule. 
Appellant cites Wilson v. Kiesel, 9 Utah 397 as sup-
port for his position. This case, however, involves the 
assignment of a claim after a suit is brought and in a 
subsequent suit the assignee is required to sue. Any 
different holding would present different issues. Appel-
lant's Gla.s and Chapman. cases appear to be contrary to 
the weight of authority. 
Thus, Falconero was legally capable of bringing the 
lawsuit under the statute and was a proper party plain-
4 
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tiff having sufficient interest under its warranty deed 
upon whi('h to bring its action. 
POINT II 
rl,HE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADDED 
CHARLES W. TAGGART AS A PLAINTIFF. 
Shortly before trial appellant filed an amended an-
~wPr raising the issue as to the dissolution of Falconaero 
I~:ntt'rprit-)e, Inc. Because of this pleading and the argu-
nwnt at pre-trial Charles W. Taggart, Trustee, Grantee 
in the warranty deed from Falconaero Enterprise, Inc., 
was added as a plaintiff in the action. 
Appellant argues in its Point 3 that (a) one, not the 
real party in interest can not join the real party in inter-
est in the lawsuit, and (b) that one lacking the legal ca-
pacity to sue can not amend the complaint. Neither of 
these• contentions are supported by the cases cited by 
appellant nor do these propositions have any application 
to our case. 
(A) ADDING PARTIES PLAINTIFF IS 
DISCRETIONARY WITH THE TRIAL 
COURT'. 
Rule 15 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in effect 
permits the amendment of the complaint. The Utah cases, 
including those cited below, uniformly hold that such 
amendments are within the discretion of the trial court. 
euless the defendant is prejudiced thereby the trial court 
LlOPs not abuse its discretion in granting such an amend-
ment and the Supreme Court will not usually interfere. 
5 
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See Johnson v. Contin,ental Casualty Co., 78 Utah 18, 300 
Pac. 1032; Shay v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 47 Utah 
252, 153 Pac. 31; and Evans v. Houtz, 57 Utah 216, 193 
Pac. 858. See also Plotkinv. Merchants Bank & Trust Co., 
125 S.E. 541 in which the grantor in a quiet title action 
had conveyed property and was permitted to amend to 
include the grantee as a plaintiff. 
Amendments of the pleadings wherein a plaintiff 
is added or even substituted come within the purview of 
the amendments permitted under ule 15 (a). See the many 
cases annotated in 135 AL 325 in support of the general 
rule that substitutions of the real party in interest are 
permissible. 
Rule 21, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
"Misjoinder of parties is not grounds for dis-
missal of an action. Parties may be dropped or 
added by order of the court or motion of any party 
or of its own initiative at any stage of the action 
and on such terms as are just. Any claim against 
a party may he severed and proceeded with sepa-
rately.'' 
The addition of Mr. Taggart therefore was a mere 
formality and does not render the complaint subject to 
dismissal. No new issues were raised and appellant was 
in no way prejudiced thereby. It would be inequitable 
and unnecessary to dismiss the action and require the 
plaintiff to proceed through a complete new action upon 
the new name. Justice does not countenance this useless 
proceeding. 
6 
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UndPr parag-raph A of appellant's Point 3 it cites 
Skewt·s v. [)/fun, 3 Utah 186. In that case, however, the 
plaintiff, after obtaining judgment in the Justice's Court 
n~~ig-nt-d the notes upon which the judgment was granted 
to his wife so that upon appeal by the defendant to the 
District Court and in the new trial to be had therein the 
wife could testify. She had been precluded from tes-
tifying hy statute in the earlier action. This prejudiced 
the dt'ft-ndant and the court did not permit a substitution 
of the wife as plaintiff. However, it appears that if there 
h<H l been no prejudice to the defendant the substitution 
would have been permitted. This holding is a far cry 
from that contended for by appellant. 
(B) INCAPACITY TO SUE DOES NOT 
PREVENT JOINING OF ADDITIONAL 
PLAINTIFFS. 
Appellant repeatedly states that Falconaero had no 
legal capacity to sue. This contention, as we have pointed 
out under Point I is laid at rest by the statute which in 
express language grants the corporation the right to sue 
for two years after its dissolution. 
However, assuming arguendo that Falconaero had 
ceased to do business, the complaint under the liberal 
rules and under the weight of authority could still be 
amended by adding a property plaintiff. In Lehl v. Strong 
J/ ercantile Co., 259 Pac. 512 (Colo.) the court held that 
a ror·pora tion eYen though having dissolved could still 
bring the action and amend the complaint to substitute 
a proper plaintiff. The court in discussing the defend-
ant's contention that the action was a nullity and could 
7 
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not therefore be amended because of the incapacity of 
the plaintiff denied such a contention and stated: 
"Of course it is not in fact a nullity; it is a very 
real thing, though not a complete action and that 
an amendment is possible all know, including those 
who say the contrary ... and when we have added 
what would have made it a complete action what is 
the sense in saying that it is not one." 
The court further went on to hold as an additional rea-
son for allowing the amendment that a fiction should 
never be allowed to work an injustice and that such an 
injustice would be worked by the fiction of holding the 
action a nullity. See also the following cases which 
have likewise held that a corporation ceasing to do busi-
ness can substitute another plaintiff; K ehrlein-Swiner-
ton Construction Co. v. Rapkin, 156 Pac. 972 (Calif.); 
Hall v. Cutler Bindery Co., 26 P. 2d 1109 (Ore.); and 
Norton v. Steinfeld,. 288 Pac. 3 (Ariz.). 
Appellant's cited cases under its paragraph B give 
him very little help. The St. Marks case is only reported 
by syllabi, but it seems to involve a plaintiff designated 
only by a description of the hospital instead of as a legal 
entity. One of the syllabi states that if the suit had in-
volved the name of a legal person then the substitution 
would have been permitted. In the Brooks case the action 
was brought after death but prior to probate and simply 
in the name of the dead person. In the Mexican Mill case 
the plaintiff was designated as follows : 
''The plaintiffs, the proprietors of the l\iexican 
Mill, a co-partnership doing business in that name 
in the county of Ormandy. '' 
8 
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( )hviously this describes nothing. Whereas our plain-
tifT, en'n under appellant's theory, was a legal person, 
hut had ceased to do business. 
It seems reasonable and proper to point out that 
appellant's arguments are not supported by the fact nor 
by the law. Under the rules and the increasingly practi-
('11 l a mlliberal application of them the amendment to add 
Mr. Taggart is not only legally sound, but equitable. Ap-
pellant was in no wise imposed upon by such an amend-
ment. 
POINT III 
THE COMPLAINT PROPERLY STATED A 
CLAIM AGAINST THE DEFENDANT AND 
SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED. 
(.A.) .APPELLANT'S POINT 4 IS RAISED 
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
Appellant can not now raise this point for the first 
time in this court since it did not bring this objection 
to the complaint up at any time prior to the filing of ap-
pellant's brief herein. (Cite cases.) See Dean. v. Davis, 
:24:2 U. S. 438; Idaho State Bank v. Hooper Sugar Co., 
7-l: Utah :24, 276 Pac. 659; 68 A. L. R. 969; and 3 Am. Jur. 
paragraphs 316-327. 
Appellant contends that the use of the word "in-
ferior" does not show the clear adversity of appellant's 
title. Appellant contends that the defense relating to 
the failure to state a claim raised this particular point. 
How could plaintiff possibly cure any defect in its plead-
mgs (if there were any) under a defense so general as 
9 
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that contended for by appellant. The statement means 
little unless it is made more specific. 
Appellant did not raise this matter concerning the 
words ''invalid and inferior'' by any motion prior to 
pre-trial. He did not raise the issue at pre-trial (pre-
trial order, R. 9-11), neither did he raise the matter at 
the beginning of the trial (R. 26), at the conclusion of 
plaintiff's case (R. 67-70), at the conclusion of the trial 
(R. 86), nor at any point during trial (R. 26-86). 
Certainly had such a minor defect (if it is such) been 
brought to light it could have been readily cured. Such 
a defect is not prejudicial error, but is a mere technical 
question involving semantics. 
(B) THE ALLEGATION IN THE COM-
PLAINT IS NOT DEFECT'IVE. 
It is remarkable that appellant in his Point 4 only 
quotes a portion of plaintiff's complaint in order to make 
his point. He omits the very wording which he claims is 
not alleged in the complaint. He concludes then that 
the mere words ''invalid and inferior'' are inadequate in 
expressing the adverse nature of appellant's claim. 
The full allegation of the complaint wherein I have 
italicized the omitted portion is as follows: 
'' 3. That plainliff is the legal and equitable owner 
of atnd in the exclusive possession and entitled to 
possession of said property; that the defendants 
named herein, both known and unknown,. claim or 
ma,y claim some interest in and to sa.id property 
1.0 
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ADVERSE to that of the plaintiff, but that said 
<'iaimrd interest of said defendant is invalid and is 
inferior to the right, title and interest of the plain-
tiff in and to said property ... (R. 2, 3). 
The complaint clearly alleged therefore that any in-
h'rl'st claimed by the defendants was adverse to the own-
N~hip of the plaintiff. Appellant mistakenly concludes 
that such language is just not proper. 
To further support his specious argument appellant 
eites l r orley v. Peterson., 80 Utah 27, 41, 12 P. 2d 579, 
:>8-t However, that case holds just opposite to appel-
lant's statement of the holding. The Worley case holds 
that even if the complaint had insufficiently alleged the 
adversity of the defendants' claim such defect was cured 
by the defendant in its answer wherein he claims title to 
the property. This obviously would be our case even if 
the complaint had not alleged the adverse nature of ap-
pellant's claim, since Appellant claims title adverse to 
that of respondent. 
Even so in the Worley case there was no allegation 
that the defendants' claim was adverse - merely an 
allegation that the claim was inferior. We can only con-
clude that a cursory look at our complaint and also at 
the court's opinion in the Worley case demonstrates that 
appellant is mistaken both as to the fact and the law 
under this point. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT IS BARRED BY THE FOUR-
YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
11 
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(A) THERE IS NO ABANDONMENT OF 
THE FOUR-YEAR STA.TUTE OF LIMI-
TATIONS. 
Title 78-12-5.1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, limits 
the time within which appellant in this case could assert 
any defense against respondents, to four years after 
the date of the tax deed, unless, of course, appellant was 
actually occupying or in possession of the land within 
that four-year period. The evidence shows and the court 
properly found that appellant was not in possession or 
in occupancy of the land within said four-year period or 
actually since 1949 (R. 14, 15). Plaintiff, in its complaint, 
did not need to plead this statute of limitations. Harnsen. v. 
Morris, 3 Utah 2d 310, 283 P. 2d 884. At the pre-trial, 
see paragraph 10 of the pre-trial order (R. 10), the issue 
of the statute of limitations was set forth. During the 
trial the statute of limitations was interjected into the 
case (R. 31, 52, 68). The memorandum decision is couched 
in terms of said statute (R. 12, 13). 
The Findings of Fact certainly set forth sufficient 
facts to warrant the conclusions that the defendant has 
no rights or claim in the property or against the plaintiff. 
The specific grounds need not be stated in the decree if 
the facts and law are in support thereof. 
(B) RESPONDENTS' TITLE STEMS FROM 
THE SALT LAKE COUNTY TAX 
DEED. 
Pre-trial Exhibit 4 is the auditor's tax deed issued 
February 28, 1939, by virtue of a previous tax sale and 
pursuant to authority of Section 80-10-66 Utah Revised 
12 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Statutes of 1933 This. statute made said deed prima facie 
evidPll<'l' of the matters and proceedings therein stated 
and preredin~ the execution of said deed. 
rrhe deed from Salt Lake County dated December 
:n, 1D-t~, executed pursuant to Title 80, Chapter 10, Sec-
tion 68, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, is prima facie evi-
dence of all of the prior proceedings leading up to the 
execution of said deed. 
There can be no doubt but that Falconaero has 
acquired the property under the tax deed and is claiming 
a tax title. Certainly each of the two deeds indicates 
their execution in ''the course of a statutory proceeding.'' 
See Title 78-12-5.3 Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Each 
deed refers specifically to that portion of the Revenue and 
Taxation statutes governing redemption from tax sales. 
N otwithsta.nding the clear language quoted by Mr. 
Callister to the effect that the tax title may be ''valid or 
im·nlid" he nevertheless contends that respondents were 
required to prove the complete validity of the entire tax 
~ale proceeding. Obviously, if there were no defects in 
this procedure we would not be concerned about adverse 
possession and the tax title would be perfect. 
Appellant's counsel at top of page 18 of his Brief 
states with such certainty "this is the law ... " that we 
must assume he is the authority in this field of law. He 
apparently deems it unnecessary to cite any cases in sup-
port of such a proclamation. Certainly Anson v. Ellison, 
104 Utah 576, 140 P. 2d 653 does not support his con-
13 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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tention. In that case the (teed was issued under Title 
80-10-68 prior to 1939 when such statute had no provision 
relating to the prima facie effect of the deed. Our deed 
was executed pursuant to Section 80-10-66 which did have 
such a provision relating to the prima facie effect of 
the deed. 
However, whether we consider the county deed to be 
a tax deed or not is immaterial. In Cope v. Bountiful Live-
stock Co., 13 Utah 2d 20, 368 P. 2d 68, this court held that 
the invalidity of the tax deed was immaterial in uphold-
ing the adverse possession and that the claim of title 
under the deed was all that was required. Also, in Peter-
son v. Callister, 6 Utah 2d 359, 313 P. 2d 814, the court, 
in holding that the tax title need not be perfect, stated, 
"This contention is answered by the observations above 
to the effect that title technically need not pass to pro-
tect a tax title claimant .... '' 
Thus, the fact that respondents claim under the tax 
deed, and not whether the tax procedure was perfect, is 
the important factor which brings into play the four-year 
statute of limitations. 
POINT V 
RESPONDENT HAS ESTABLISHED AD-
VERSE POSSESSION. 
(A) ADVERSE POSSESSION IS AMPLY 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Title 78-12-9 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, sets forth 
the elements of adverse possession when claimed under a 
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written instrument, any one of which is sufficient to sus-
tain n title by adverse possession. By uncontroverted 
eviJence respondent has conclusively proven more than 
one of the elements. These statutory elements proven in 
this case and found by the court in the Findings of Fact 
are as follows: 
1. LOJYtd cultivated or improved. Mr. Darrel Firmage 
testified that the land was leveled and drainage ditches 
placed thereon ( R. 40). 
~. Protection by a substantial enclosure. Mr. Ben-
nett, :Mr. Andy Firmage and Mr. Darrell Firmage all 
testified that beginning in 1948 and continuing to 1963 the 
land was fenced by a barbed wire and electric wire fence 
and that said fencing was maintained for the purpose of 
keeping stock grazing on the land (R. 31-34, 43, 57, 61, Ex-
hibit P. 29). The nature of the land and the fencing shown 
by the photographs and testified to by Mr. Knowlton all 
conclusively prove that the fencing was certainly open 
and ,·isible (R. 79, 80). 
3. Pasturage. It is clear that from 1948 on through 
1963 the land was used for pasturing the riding horses 
and for riding, all in connection with the overall devel-
opment of the land owned by Falconaero (R. 40-42, 54, 62, 
Exhibits P. 22-26). These financial records for the com-
pany show receipts year after year for the pasturage and 
expenses for fencing, (Exhibit P. 29), which are the 
financial account cards, show horse rental and pasturing 
O\er the years in question. 
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The land in question is situate on the interior of an 
entire tract of land owned by Falconero (Exhibit P. 5). 
The land surrounding the subject 20 acres, as well as the 
land outside of the thousand-acre tract of land, is essen-
tially pasture land (Exhibit P. 8 through P. 18). Appel-
lant, however compares the land to the Industrial Center, 
formerly the Arms Plant and the large buildings situate 
thereon which lie to the North of this property and North 
of 21st South Street. Appellant seems to contend that 
unless Falconero had used the thousand acres including 
the Chuck Wagon, the lake and the pasture land for some 
sort of industrial endeavor that the use would not be ade-
quate for adverse possession. Such a position is extreme 
to say the least and without legal authority. Further-
more, it is completely beyond the statutory provisions 
relating to adverse possession cited above. 
(B) THE TAXES ARE PAID FOR SEVEN 
YEARS. 
Respondent promptly paid all of the general taxes 
on the land from 1955 through 1961 for a total of seven 
years (Exhibit P. 20). In addition the respondent had 
paid the taxes, although said taxes were delinquent from 
1949 through 1954 (R. 68, 69). The adverse possession 
occurred not only during the seven years during >;rhich 
taxes were paid, but also during the prior period from 
1949 through 1954. All of the evidence to support the 
foregoing facts is uncontroverted, is substantial and is 
more than sufficient to sustain the adverse possession 
ruling of the lower court. 
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(C) APPELLANT IS BARRED BY THE 
SEVEN YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITA-
TIONS. 
Title 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-6 require that one seeking 
Pither in a complaint or a counterclaim to rcover posses-
sion of real property shall have been seized thereof with-
in seven years prior to bringing the action or interposing 
the defense. There is absolutely no proof that appellant 
has been seized of this property within said seven year 
pNiod. To the contrary, the evidence is uncontroverted 
that appellant has not been in occupancy or possession of 
the property within that period. Therefore, it is ines-
capable that appellant is barred from asserting any claim 
in said property. 
SUMMARY 
When Falconaero, through the Firmages, has pur-
rhased the property pursuant to tax deeds from Salt Lake 
County, has changed the property in its entirety, has used 
the property for pasturing and for the development of an 
overall recreation area, all occurring over the continuous 
period from 1949 to the beginning of the lawsuit, it seems 
strange indeed that appellant can contend that such usage 
does not constitute open, adverse and notorious posses-
sion. Appellant tlthough acquiring a quit claim deed 
from an heir of the prior record owner has neither estab-
lished a record title to the property nor has it established 
any possession or occupancy or even a claim thereof. 
The evidence therefore precludes appellant from chal-
lenging the title and possession of respondent. 
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The questions raised by appellant relating to alle-
gations and the sufficiency of the complaint are more in 
the nature of last-minute technical objections, and they 
are completely without merit or equity. They are an at-
tempt by fiction to require respondent to commence the 
action anew. These objections as to the technicalities not 
only are without merit, but they do not serve as preju-
dicial errors subject to appeal. 
Respondents respectfully submit that the appellant's 
arguments are completely without merit and that the 
judgment of the lower court should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT 
BY------------------------------------------------------------
ELLIOTT LEE PRATT 
18 
Attorneys for 
Pla,intiff s-Respondents 
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